



EFFECT OF WIDE JUDICIAL DISCRETION ON THE LEGALITY OF 
SENTENCING AT THE ICTY 
  
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Bachelor of Laws Degree, 








Prepared under the supervision of 
















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .............................................................................................................. iv 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................. v 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF CASES ........................................................................................................................... viii 
ICTY CASE LAW ..................................................................................................................... viii 
ICTR CASE LAW ..................................................................................................................... viii 
ICC CASE LAW ....................................................................................................................... viii 
ECtHR CASE LAW .................................................................................................................. viii 
USA CASE LAW ....................................................................................................................... viii 
GERMAN CASE LAW ............................................................................................................. viii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM........................................................................... 1 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................... 2 
1.3. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY ............................................................................... 2 
1.4. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE ..................................................................................... 2 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................................. 3 
1.6. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 3 
1.7. HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................................ 4 
1.8. ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................... 4 
1.9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..................................................................................... 4 
1.9.1. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ........................................................ 5 
1.9.2. CHAPTER SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 6 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................... 7 
2.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 7 
2.2. FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVISM ..................................................................................... 7 
2.3. FROM BENTHAM TO HART ............................................................................................ 8 
2.3.1. Jeremy Bentham ............................................................................................................ 8 
2.3.2. John Austin .................................................................................................................... 8 
2.3.2. H L A Hart ......................................................................................................................... 9 
2.4.1 Nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali .................................................................... 11 
2.4.2 Nulla poena sine lege scripta .................................................................................. 11 
iii 
 
2.4.3 Nulla poena sine lege certa ..................................................................................... 12 
2.4.4 Nulla poena sine lege stricta ................................................................................... 12 
2.5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 13 
CHAPTER 3: JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICTY ...................................................................... 13 
3.1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 13 
3.2. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA ............................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
3.3. SENTENCING PRACTICE OF THE ICTY ..................................................................... 14 
3.3.1. ISSUE OF LEGALITY BEFORE THE ICTY ............................................................ 14 
3.3.2. RULES AND PROCEDURE OF SENTENCING ....................................................... 15 
3.3.3. PURPOSE OF SENTENCING .................................................................................... 17 
3.3.4. GRAVITY OF CRIMES .............................................................................................. 19 
3.3.5. REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL PRACTICE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
 ................................................................................................................................................ 20 
3.4. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 4: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ICTY JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE POINT OF 
VIEW OF HART’S JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY ....... 22 
4.1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 22 
4.2. HART’S JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE SENTENCING PRACTICE OF THE 
ICTY .......................................................................................................................................... 23 
4.3. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND THE SENTENCING PRACTICE OF THE 
ICTY .......................................................................................................................................... 24 
4.4. ICC SENTENCING: LOOKING FORWARD .................................................................. 25 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 27 
5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 28 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 29 
BOOKS ...................................................................................................................................... 29 
STATUTES ................................................................................................................................ 30 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ...................................................................................... 30 
JOURNAL ARTICLES ............................................................................................................. 30 
ONLINE ARTICLES ................................................................................................................ 31 
UN DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................... 32 
CONFERENCE PAPER ........................................................................................................... 32 







I would like to thank God without whom none of this would be possible. I would like to thank 
my father, Michael Kinyanjui, who never once tired of listening to me, my mother Joyce 
Kinyanjui for her unending love and support, and my supervisor Jerusha Owino whose patience 
and grace allowed me to complete this work.  
This dissertation is dedicated to the men and women the world over who refuse to accept that 























I, Ivy Nyambura Kinyanjui, do hereby declare that this research is my original work and that 
to the best of my knowledge and belief, it has not been previously, in its entirety or in part, 
been submitted to any other university for a degree or diploma. Other works cited or referred 
























This dissertation looks into the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and identifies that the judges enjoyed unfettered judicial discretion in 
sentencing due to the minimal provisions on sentencing within the Statute and Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure. This wide judicial discretion has led to inconsistency in the 
determination of gravity of crimes, aggravating and mitigating circumstances and reference to 
the general practice of the former Yugoslavia. The study then uses Hart’s theory of judicial 
discretion within the larger context of positivism, in order to determine that the inconsistent 
jurisprudence of the tribunal has violated the principle of legality. The hypotheses was that 
there was inconsistent sentencing in the ICTY. The dissertation looked into the sentencing 
practice of the International Criminal Court as the future of international criminal justice and 
determines that there are possible challenges to sentencing there and offers recommendations. 
One of the recommendations is to have the Assembly of State Parties pass a document with 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
 
While the origins of international criminal law go back to the times that the pirate was 
considered as hostishumanis generis and each member of the then small international 
community had jurisdiction over him, the defining moment of the international criminal justice 
system as it is known today was The Nuremberg Tribunals.1 In his opening address as Chief 
Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Justice Robert H. Jackson 
declared that: 
“…the wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so 
malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, 
because it cannot survive their being repeated.”2 
This set the tone for the beginning of international criminal justice. 
Until recently, the design of much of the system was ad hoc and reactive to world  events  rather  
than  the  result  of  any  sort  of  coherent forward-looking process. Following the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg the next tribunal on the core crimes was the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. There has since been other tribunals, in response 
to atrocities committed, which have then led to the International Criminal Court (ICC). A 
notable exception is that the ICC has only prospective jurisdiction.3 
Even with the gains that international criminal justice system has madethere has been great 
controversy concerning the sentencing in the ad hoc tribunals.4  This has been characterized by 
a lack of transparency on sentencing rulings owing to the lack of clear sentencing guidelines. 
Any system of law requires a minimum of certainty, and any dispute settlement system a 
                                                             
1 Green L, ‘New Trends in International Criminal Law,’ Volume 5 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights (1981), 12.  
2Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 1947, 98, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-11.pdf.  
3 Article 13, Rome Statute, 17 July 1998. 
4 Song S, “The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and Challenges” The 




minimum of foreseeability. This, however, is lacking at the international criminal justice 
system.  
1.2.STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The ICTY has no standardized sentencing ranges or guidelines on sentencing. This lack of 
sentencing ranges or sentencing guidelines is unlike what is found in national criminal law 
jurisdictions. Common law systems usually have sentencing guidelines while civil law systems 
usually have sentencing ranges. The ICTY Statute provides that punishment is limited to 
imprisonment and that while passing judgement, the judges will take into consideration the 
individual circumstances of the accused person.5 These laconic provisions on sentencing have 
granted the judges wide judicial discretion, which provides for inconsistent sentencing within 
the tribunal. This issue is compounded by the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis does not 
apply at this level; the lack of determinate reference on sentencing has made it irregular.6 
1.3.JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The core international crimesare loaded with many ideological and political interests that are 
crying for a ‘just’ solution, which places the international sentence at the forefront of the 
debate.7 It is necessary to conduct this research because there has been a lot of criticism on the 
efficiency of the international criminal tribunals on their sentencing practice.8 The three core 
crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) are taken to be so horrific that there is 
a need to establish special mechanisms and special courts to try the cases. In case the sentencing 
practice does not align with the principle of legality, then this will affect the legitimacy of the 
entire criminal justice system. 
1.4.STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study is to identify whether or not there has been inconsistent sentencing 
at the ICTY brought about by the wide judicial discretion enjoyed by the judges and whether 
                                                             
5 Article 23, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, Article 24, Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993. 
6 Allison D,’ Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing,’ Virginia Law Review 
(1995), 451. 
7http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-CICC-CoreCrimesinRS.pdf.  




the existence of such inconsistency has affected the legality of the tribunal itself. The 
dissertation will also look at whether or not there is in theory any established principles of 
sentencing by the ad hoc tribunals that could be codified by the International Criminal Court 
as its rule of procedure in order to establish a consistent and more transparent way of sentencing 
thereby reducing the judicial discretion at this level. This will be done by looking into whether 
or not there is a uniform system of international criminal justice and whether or not the 




a. Whether or not there is unfettered judicial discretion at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia 
b. Whether the wide judicial discretion afforded the judges has led to inconsistencies in 
sentencing 




This research paper will use as the main reference, the book by Silvia D’scoli on Sentencing in 
International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for the ICC.9 
The Ad Hoc tribunals where the author highlights the inconsistencies of sentencing in the ad 
hoc tribunals and suggests that the best way to improve on this, is by establishing a hierarchy 
of the core crimes with genocide being the most grave. She highlights the fact that though the 
courts have stated that there is no hierarchy, empirical evidence on the jurisprudence, points to 
the fact that there is in fact a hierarchy based on the sentencing with war crimes receiving the 
least number of years and genocide receiving the most number of years.  Another reference 
will be the journal article by Allison Marson on Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing where she outlines the inconsistencies in sentencing by 
                                                             
9 D’Ascoli S, Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for 
the ICC, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011, 23. 
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the international criminal tribunals.10 She suggests that this is partly because the philosophy of 
the Netherlands where the Tribunals are found relies heavily on rehabilitation as opposed to 
retribution. This is also partly the reason for the minimal sentences passed. She however, 
expressly states that there is no hierarchy of crimes. Another reference is Sentencing and the 
Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law by Andrew Carcano where he suggests 




The hypotheses of this study is that the sentencing practice of the ICTY is inconsistent owing 
to the wide judicial discretion enjoyed by the judges and that the lack of clear sentencing 
guidelines within this tribunal either in the form of sentencing ranges for particular crimes or 
sentencing guidelines for crimes has jeopardised the tribunal’s ability to guarantee the highest 
degree of uniformity and fairness, thereby putting into question the legality of these courts and 
in particular, the legality of their sentencing practices.   
1.8.ASSUMPTIONS 
 
(i) That there is no hierarchy of crimes in international criminal justice. 
(ii) That there is no uniform international criminal justice system. 
(iii) That the purpose of sentencing in national criminal justice systems are the same as 
that of the international criminal justice system. 




                                                             
10 Danner A M, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Ssentencing,’ 87 Virginia Law 
Review (2001), 467. 
11Carcano A, ‘Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law’ 51 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2002), 583 – 609. 
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The research methodology that is to be used is qualitative method of research. This will involve 
a lot of computer based research. Books, journal articles, cases and other documents will be 
used in conducting this research.12 
1.9.1. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The scope of this study is on sentencing within the international criminal justice system and in 
particular the ICTY. This study will look into case studies from the ICTY and look into what 
the International Criminal Court has done different with regard to sentencing and what could 
possibly be done to improve sentencing before the first permanent international criminal 
court.13 The limitation of this study is that the court is always issuing new decisions and the 
decisions may affect the findings made under this study. Further, with regard to the 
international criminal court, any rules of procedure must be approved by the Assembly of State 
Parties,14 a body whose constitution and mandate is political in nature something which may 
affects the legal working of the court and in turn politicizes every single issue brought before 
it.15 
The thesis will be limited to the ICTY and not to both ad hoc tribunals because, even though 
they had very similar Statutes in wording, the reference to domestic practices in the respective 
States as far as sentencing is concerned has greatly distinguished the jurisprudence of the two 
courts.  
It may be difficult to make causal inferences from the case studies, because it may be 
impossible to rule out alternative explanations. It may be unclear about the generality of the 
findings of the case studies that will done from the jurisprudence of the ICTY. While a case 
study involves the behaviour of one person, group, or organization, the behaviour of this one 
unit of analysis may or may not reflect the behaviour of similar entities. In this context, the 
decisions passed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were 
arrived at after many considerations were made and it will be challenging to isolate particular 
                                                             
12 Kothari C R, Research Methodology Methods and Techniques, New Age International Limited Publishers, New 
Delhi, 2013, 113, https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/methodology.  
13http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp4m.htm.  
14https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/publications/factsheet/Documents/ASP-Factsheet-2013-v4-ENG-
web.pdf. 
15 Guillaume G, ‘The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’ Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement Volume 2 (2011), 5.  
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features of sentencing.  This issue is exacerbated by the fact that at the international level, the 
doctrine of stare decisis does not apply.16 
1.9.2. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The introductory Chapter lays down the background and justification of this study. The study 
seeks to identify the inconsistencies in sentencing practice at the international level, which in 
turn has made the sentencing process opaque.  
Chapter two will look into the theoretical framework of the research by looking at positivism 
and H L A Hart’s take on it. It will be used to analyse the existing practice in sentencing in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  
Chapter three will look into a case study by looking into the existing jurisprudence. This 
chapter shall look into areas that point towards the wide judicial discretion enjoyed by the 
judges of the ICTY. The ratio decidendi of the various judges will be looked at. 
Chapter four shall discuss the jurisprudence of the ICTY from the point of view of the 
theoretical framework. Here, the bulk of the work will be done and the new findings shall be 
discussed. 
Finally, the study will make recommendations based the possible principles derived from the 
ad hoc tribunals on sentencing and prescribe their application by the International Criminal 
Court in order to streamline sentencing within the international criminal justice system. The 






                                                             
16 The rule of stare decisis, or more precisely, the rule of stare rationibus decisis: that courts are bound by the 
reasoning of the judgments already rendered. These judgments create the law, and that law must be respected, 














Positivism is among the most influential theoretical approaches to international law.17 The 
existence of International Law and especially International Criminal Law is itself an ode to 
legal positivism. The validity of international law as law has been expounded by legal 
positivists belonging to the analytical jurisprudence school of thought. Therefore, any 
conversation concerning legal philosophy and international law, should include a discussion of 
legal positivism. It is from this departure that the issue of sentencing shall be discussed.  
2.2. FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVISM 
 
Positivism begins with the quest of legal philosophers to distinguish between what law is and 
what law ought to be. Both Bentham and Austin accused natural law philosophers of making 
it so that it had become impossible to distinguish between the two. Natural lawyers maintained 
that there was no separation of the law from morality and in fact that the former stemmed from 
the latter. Herein lies the key distinction between positivism and natural moral law.  
IN the simplest terms, positivism asserts the question of what the law is and what the law ought 
to be are two different things. It affirms that it is possible to enter into a discussion about what 
the law is without necessarily looking into the merits or demerits of it.  
The earliest proposers of this school of thought include Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) and 
John Austin (1790 – 1859). 
                                                             
17 Ratner and Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers’ 93 American 
Journal on International Law (1999), 291, Shapiro S J, Legality, Harvard University Press, 2013, 26–30. 
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2.3. FROM BENTHAM TO HART 
 
2.3.1. Jeremy Bentham 
Jeremy Bentham is credited for being one of the founders of modern day legal positivism.18 He 
is well known as a utilitarian who espoused the belief that the law should be viewed as ‘the 
greatest good for the greatest number.19 He went ahead and tore apart the then held beliefs on 
the law and society. He attacked the central ideas of natural law and the social contract theory 
as embodied in the Blackstone commentaries.20 
He stated that nature has given us both pleasure and pain as a way of determining our conduct.21 
According to this rubric, mankind does what gives them the greatest pleasure and avoids what 
brings pain. This was the basis on which Bentham wanted the laws to be analysed and studied. 
With this, Bentham challenged that laws were extracted by morals. For him, the law, could be 
empirically established and had to do with the greatest pleasure for the largest number. His 
approach was rational and emphasized conceptual clarity and deductive argument.22 
2.3.2. John Austin 
John Austin, himself a student of Jeremy Bentham described the law as a command by a 
sovereign backed by a sanction.23 In defining the word command, he described it as normative 
statements laid down in order to influence human conduct, other than merely statements of 
fact.24 He described them as imperative. He also went ahead to describe the law as being 
separate from morals. 
                                                             
18Freeman M, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2014, 15. 
19 Bentham J, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,Prometheus Books, 1823, 6. This idea 
of the ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ was initially adopted by Cesare Beccaria of the Enlightenment 
Period, Dei DelittiedellePene (1764) where the Italian law reformer announced that the only valid criterion for 
evaluating the merits of a law is “la messimafelicitàdivisanelmaggiornumero”—the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number. 
20 Blackstone W, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1769, 4. 
21Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 6. Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. They alone point out what we ought to do and determine 
what we shall do; the standard of right and wrong, and the chain of causes and effects, are both fastened to their 
throne. They govern us in all we do, all we say, all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection 
to pain and pleasure· will only serve to demonstrate and confirm it. A man may claim to reject their rule but in 
reality he will remain subject to it. The principle of utility1 recognises this subjection, and makes it the basis of a 
system that aims to have the edifice of happiness built by the hands of reason and of law. 
22https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/. 
23 Austin J, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Nabu Press, 2014, 234, he was heavily influenced by 
Jeremy Bentham who helped become a lecturer at the newly found University of London. 
24Freeman M, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 6.  
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2.3.2. H L A Hart 
H L A Hart is considered one of the most influential contributors to legal positivism as a school 
of jurisprudence.25Hart borrowed from both Austin and Bentham on their views on the law. 
Hart explains that whether or not the law exists is a separate question from the quality of the 
law itself and whether it conforms to a particular standard.26 He further asserts that the law 
should be formed from rational considerations and not from morality which cannot be 
empirically determined. He was a great supporter of formalism and empiricism in the analysis 
of law.  
According to Hart, there are two types of rules which constitute the quintessence of the law 
that is primary rules and secondary rules.27 It is important to identify the two types of rules as 
different while at the same time appreciating their interrelation. 
Under the one type of rule, that is, the primary rule, people are obliged to either do certain types 
of actions or to avoid doing certain types of actions. This type of rule does not take into 
consideration the preference of the human being and people have no choice to follow it. The 
other type pf rule, that is, the secondary rule do not exist on their own. They arise from the first 
one. They create the rules that determine how laws will be changed and how the law will confer 
powers to certain individuals or institutions within the society. They help to either modify or 
remove altogether the primary rules.28 
For example, Criminal Law may be considered as Primary Rules because they regulate the 
conduct of individuals by sanctioning certain actions and prescribing punishment for them. The 
Constitutional articles that confer legislative powers to Parliament are a good example of 
secondary rules.  
Hart further categorised secondary rules as rules of recognition, rules of change, or rules of 
adjudication. Rules of recognition make it possible to identify what is or is not a legitimate 
primary rule.29 In any legal system, this might be a reference to a particular statute or text 
containing the law that is authoritative in nature. It may also be the pre-set standard of law that 
                                                             
25 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart was a legal philosopher and professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and 
the principal at Brasenose College, Oxford. 
26 Hart H L A, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ 71 Harvard Law Review(1958), 596. 
27Hart H, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, 130. 
28Hart H, The Concept of Law, 151. 
29Hart H ,The Concept of Law, 151. 
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has already been established. As the society becomes more and more sophisticated, the law 
also grows in complexity and this is the same for the rules of recognition.30 
The theoretical core of positivism according to Hart consists of three theses. These are: the 
separability thesis, the pedigree thesis and the discretion thesis.31 The separability thesis states 
that there is a difference between law and morality and that neither one stems from the other. 
The pedigree thesis is concerned with the validity of laws. It concerns who made the law and 
whether they had the proper authority to make it, thus rendering the law valid or not. The 
discretion thesis concerns the judicial discretion that judges exercise in the case where there is 
not sufficient law on a matter or where two rules conflict. In such a case, a judge may rightly 
come to whatever rational decision. In these hard cases, judges make new law. 
Hart further asserts that when considering all the rules under the law, there are cases that will 
be a “core of certainty”. That is cases that are central in character where the way in which the 
law applies is clear. There will also exist certain cases that can only be described as “penumbra 
of doubt” because it is not certain how the law applies to it. In such a case, the application of 
the rule is uncertain.32 At this margin of uncertainty, Hart states that judges will ultimately have 
to use their own discretion where it is not clear how the law directly applies to a case. That is 
referred to as “open texture”. In exercising discretion, the judges have to consider the purpose 
or the final result in society of applying a particular interpretation of the law as opposed to a 
different one. They essentially have to come up with new law. They have to consider varying 
policy arguments.33 
According to Hart, judicial discretion is a result of the uncertainty of social considerations. 
They are numerous and many times contradictory. It may not be possible to use a singular 
standard that settle an upcoming contingencies way in advance. To be guided by precedent is 
not a reliable system since in many cases, the facts and situation will be very different. While 
common sense might eliminate certain similitudes in standards as unbefitting, conflicting 
standards that will seem more or less reasonable will always abound.34 Whereas the law may 
help to settle these conflicts and doubts, the mere use of statutes to do so does not remove all 
                                                             
30Starr W, ‘Law and Morality in H.L.A. Hart's Legal Philosophy’ 67 Marquette Law Review (1984), 684. 
31 Hart, The Concept of Law, 152. 
32 Hart, The Concept of Law, 123.  
33Penner J, Schiff D, Nobles R, Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: Commentary and Materials, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, 121. 
34 Shapiro S J, ‘The Hart – Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, Public Law and Legal 
Theory’Working Paper Series (2007), 123.  
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of them and in some instances, none at all. For Hart, then judges have strong discretion when 
the law is not itself clear or if two competing rules and so the judge ought to use their discretion 
to come to a decision. 
 
2.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
An important component of the rule of law is the principle of legality, or government according 
to law.35 This principle has well been explained by the Constitutional Court of Germany which 
is quintessential example of a country of the civil law jurisdiction. However, other common 
law legal philosophers have also expounded on the principle. The principle has four different 
components outlined below.36 
2.4.1 Nullapoena sine praevia legepoenali   
There is to be no penalty without previous law.37 This prohibits laws that are made after the 
crime has already been committed then trying to use these new laws to pass sanctions on those 
previous offenders. It refers to the non-retroactivity of the law and has become pervasive in 
modern legal practice. It can in fact be considered to be a part of basic rule of law and due 
process. It protects individuals from being arbitrarily prosecutes, convicted or punished. In a 
larger sense, it underpins the rule of law. This has already been stressed by the European Court 
of Human Rights in Puhk v Estonia.38 
2.4.2 Nullapoena sine lege scripta 
It simply means that there should be no punishment without prior written law. All crimes or 
criminal conduct must not only be proscribed by the law, it must be proscribed by written law. 
It must not only be clear to members of the public at large but also to members of the bench. 
This requirement specifically removes as operational any customary law as a basis of criminal 
law. A person may not be tried or convicted for something that is not already proscribed by 
law. This principle is accepted and codified in modern democratic states as a basic requirement 
                                                             
35Dicey A, The Law of the Constitution, Elibron Classics, 1959, 188.  
36Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, (2001), 246, Article 103(2),  
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), Boot M, ‘Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War 
Crimes: NullumCrimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ School 
of Human Rights Research, (2002), 94. 
37 Article 7, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, Article 
15(2), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966.  
38EctHR, Judgment of 10 February, 2004, para 45.  
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of the rule of law.39 It has been described as "one of the most 'widely held value-judgement in 
the entire history of human thought".40 
2.4.3 Nullapoena sine lege certa 
There can be no punishment without definite law. The penal must define a crime with the 
utmost level of certainty and definiteness. This should be able to assist members of the public 
to use their rational calculator in assessing what is and is not a crime and what punishment they 
would incur for undertaking certain criminal actions. This principle is already enunciated in 
many national jurisdictions and has been recognised by the European Court of Justice as a 
"general principle of Union law".41 It is related to the principles of specificity and 
accessibility.42Along with the necessary requirements of certainty, specificity, foreseeability 
and accessibility, the above account for the principle of legality.43 
2.4.4 Nullapoena sine lege stricta 
There should not be any punishment without strict law. This proscribes the application of 
criminal law and its sanctions by way of analogy. Basically, a person cannot be punished for a 
crime or conduct for which the law does not provide for and to a high degree of certainty and 
definiteness.44 
It is not enough for there to be likeness and a comparison between two similar conducts.45It is 
also a shield for accused persons from any interpretation of the law that would greatly make 
their case worse. In this sense, it helps to uphold the presumption of innocence. This principle 
is satisfied when an accused person can read and understand for statute what criminal conduct 
is and with the help of the judicial system understand what they are liable for with regard to 
their criminal act or omissions.46 
This principle generally provides that only the law can proscribe criminal conduct and that it 
must do so with a certain level of definiteness. 
                                                             
39Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: The Principle of Legality in International Criminal 
Law Sentencing, 99 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 857 (2009) 
40Justice Scalia in Rogers v. Tennessee, citing J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 59 (2d ed. 1960 
41  Klip, André (2011). Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union,  p. 69 
42 Trial Chamber Vasilijevic, IT-98-32-T, 2002 Para 193.  
43 http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.library.strathmore.edu/uk/legal/#link0 
44Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-A, IT-96-23/1-A.  
45  Veeber v Estonia (No. 2), the European Court of Human Rights. 




The above chapter has looked into the theoretical framework of the dissertation that is 
positivism from the point of view of Hart, and the principle of legality and all its components. 
The following chapter shall look into the jurisprudence of the ICTY and thereafter analyse how 











This Chapter will look into the history of the ICTY and how it came to be. The jurisprudence 
of the ICTY will be looked into with an emphasis on the general factors that have influenced 
sentencing, that is: the purposes of sentencing, the gravity of the crimes and the general practice 
of the former Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the jurisprudence of the court shall be analysed from the 
point of view of Hart’s judicial discretion and the principle of legality.  
It was not until 1993 when the Security Council proposed to set up a Tribunal. In a passed 
resolution, the Security Council expressed grave alarm at the widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law and reported cases of ethnic cleansing and mass killings.47 As 
a means to end the crimes committed and to bring to justice the perpetrators, the Council 
decided to establish the Tribunal.48 The Tribunal was formally established UN Security Council 
Resolutions 827.49The Resolution adopted the Statute of the Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the 
                                                             
47UNSC/RES/808 (1993) The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 2. 
48 S/RES/808, 1. 
49 S/RES/827 (1993) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 4. 
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court included four areas: breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and 
customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity.50 
By then, there was no precedent on how to conduct international criminal trials other than what 
was the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials after World War 2. By the time the judges arrives in 
November 1993, there were no rules, no procedure and no cases.51 Staff also had to be recruited 
from varying jurisdictions with different practices, which had to be forged into a single 
international criminal justice system.  In a sense, the tribunal was a pioneer.  
The first indictment delivered by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY was against Dragan Nikolic. 
He was the director of the Susica Detention Camp located in Bosnia and Herzegovina which 
was managed by the Serbs. The indictment was delivered in 1994 and was confirmed on 12 
February 1999 and contained 80 counts of Crimes against Humanity, Grave Breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, and Violations of the Laws or Customs of War.52 After he pleaded guilty 
in September 2003, his sentence was later reduced from 23 years to 20 years.53 
The highest profile case in the Tribunal to date was on Slobodan Milosevic.54 He was the then 
President of Serbia from July 1997 to September 2000 having served two terms. In October 
2000, he relinquished his position having lost the presidential elections for the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.55 He was indicted as a sitting president.56 
3.3. SENTENCING PRACTICE OF THE ICTY 
 
3.3.1. ISSUE OF LEGALITY BEFORE THE ICTY 
 
                                                             





54Prosecutor v Milosevic, ICTY. 
55http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ai040421-e.html.  
56 His formal charges included genocide, murder, torture, unlawful confinement, inhumane acts, extermination 
and attacks on civilians, among others. Separate indictments were filed for his crimes in Kosovo, Bosnia and 




The issue of legality was dealt with in the landmark case of Tadic by the tribunal.57DuskoTadic 
was accused of committing war crimes in a Serb – run camp within Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The issue brought before the Appeals Chamber concerned the illegal foundation of the 
Tribunal.58 The Chamber held that the Security Council had the power to establish such a 
Tribunal while exercising its powers under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.59 This made it so that 
the Chamber look into whether there was retroactive application of law, which it found there 
was not and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction accorded to it by the Statute. Although the Statute 
was enacted by the Security Council, after the conflict was underway and many of the crimes 
had already been enacted, the Geneva Conventions had already proscribed much of the conduct 
alleged. 
However, the case itself, dealt mainly with the issue of the nulla sine crimen principle but did 
not go much into the issue of the penalties prescribed by the Statute. The Chamber did not 
determine whether, the principle had been satisfied, as far as penalties were concerned.  
3.3.2. RULES AND PROCEDURE OF SENTENCING 
 
The Statute of the ICTY sets out the framework within which the ad hoc Tribunals shall 
operate. Following the trial of the accused, the Trial Chambers shall pronounce judgements 
and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.60 Judgements must be made by a majority of the judges in the Chamber, and 
must be delivered in public. A reasoned opinion made in writing, to which separate or 
dissenting opinions may be appended, must accompany the judgement.61 In Article 24 of the 
ICTY Statute – which contains the substantive provisions on punishment, it is stated that:62 
“The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining 
the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice 
regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia. In imposing the sentences, 
                                                             
57Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY Judgement of 2 October 1995, para. 135.  
58http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.html. 
59Prosecutor v Tadic, para. 35.  
60http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/judgements-and-sentencing.  
61http://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/judgements-and-sentencing.  
62 Secretary- General’s Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/25704. 
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the Trial Chambers should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.” 
In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and 
proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners.63 
The above is the entire substantive law on penalties as prescribed by the Statute. 
In order to augment the laconic provisions of the Statute, the ICTY judges have incorporated a 
number of provisions on sentencing into the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, the 
most pertinent being Rule 101, which provides that a convicted person may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life.64 It 
also provides that, in determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account the 
factors mentioned in Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Statute, as well as such factors as: any 
aggravating circumstances; any mitigating circumstances including the substantial cooperation 
with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction; the general practice 
regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia; the extent to which any 
penalty imposed by a court of any State on the convicted person for the same act has already 
been served.65 Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period, if any, during which 
the convicted person was detained in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial 
or appeal.66 
The fact that the substantive provisions of punishment are so scarce threatens the principle of 
legality. Very little is included in this and the mitigating and aggravating factors are only 
included as part of procedural requirements. 
The following part will look into four areas where the sentencing policy of the ICTY has been 
inconsistent; that is areas where the judges in different cases have made such divergent 
decisions that it is not clear where the Tribunal lies.  These include: the purposes of sentencing, 
the  
                                                             
63 Article 25, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
64Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY. 
65http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev44_en.pdf.  
66Rule 101, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY, ICTY Rules, 12 January 2001, UN Doc. IT/32Rev. 19, 
Ntanda D, ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ 5 
Criminal Law Forum (1994), 507. 
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3.3.3. PURPOSE OF SENTENCING 
The Statute of the ICTY does not specifically mention the reasons for the imposition of criminal 
sanctions. Nevertheless, the principles of retribution and deterrence have been identified as 
being the essential functions of punishment.67 Such an approach replicates the strong language 
of the resolutions establishing the ad hoc Tribunals in which the Security Council affirmed its 
conviction that the prosecution of persons accused of committing violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ‘will contribute to ensuring that such 
violations are halted and effectively redressed’. Retributive or ‘just desert’ theory places the 
requirements of justice, rather than the pursuit of crime prevention, at the foundation of the 
general justification for criminal sanctions.68 According to this theory, punishment is the 
morally appropriate response to crime and thereby rectifies the moral balance that was upset 
by the offender’s wrongdoing. As Hart observes, the ‘application to the offender of the pain of 
punishment is itself a thing of value’.69 In this connection, despite the negative connotations 
commonly associated with the concept of retribution, it has been acknowledged that 
‘punishment for having violated international humanitarian law is, in light of the serious nature 
of the crimes committed, a relevant and important consideration’.70 This view has been 
endorsed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski case, who – after noting that this 
factor should not be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge – emphasised that ‘a sentence 
of the Tribunal should make plain the condemnation of the international community was not 
ready to tolerate serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights’.71 
The ICTY has stated that the principle of deterrence is probably the most important factor in 
the assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian law. Apart 
from the fact that the accused should be sufficiently deterred by appropriate sentence from ever 
                                                             
67Greenwalt A,’ International Criminal Law for Retributivists’ 35 University of Pennslyvania Journal for 
International Law, (2014), 1007. 
68M D Dubber, ‘The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California’s Habitual Criminal 
Statute’ 43 Stanford Law Review (1990), 202. 
69Hart H L A, Punishment and Responsibility Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, 8–9, Pickard D B, ‘Proposed 
Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court’ 20 Loyola Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Journal (1997), 125 (noting that ‘the retributive theory emphasises that punishment should 
primarily view the offender rather than society at large; that the gravity of the offence should generally dictate the 
extent of the sanction; and, most importantly, that the offender must suffer for the choice to do wrong’). 
70Prosecutor v. Kupreškic& Others, ICTY Judgement of 22 January 1998, para. 848. 
71Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, ICTY Judgement of 24 March 2000, para. 185. 
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contemplating taking part in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the future should 
similarly be deterred from resorting to such crimes.72 This view was also shared by the Chief 
Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal.73 
However, the view that sentences have a special deterrent effect in that they deter the specific 
accused from again committing similar crimes has not been widely supported. In the 
Kunaraccase, for instance, the Trial Chamber held that ‘the likelihood of persons convicted 
here ever again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote as to render its consideration in this way 
unreasonable and unfair’.74 
The ICTY has recognised that besides being retributory and a deterrent, punishment should 
also fulfil an objective of rehabilitation and incapacitation.75 The first of these theories – which 
emphasises the treatment, rather than the punishment of convicted offenders – is necessary 
especially when the accused are young and ill-trained.  
The Trial Chamber sitting in the case of Prosecutor v. Delalic& Others recognised that the 
protection of society from convicted persons was a prominent factor in the determination of 
appropriate sentence.76 However, since they did not adjudge any of the three accused found 
guilty to be dangerous to society, the rationale of incapacitative sentencing did not play a 
crucial role in their decision.  
In light of the fierce criticism that followed the pronouncement of a five-year sentence with 
respect to DrazenErdemovic, it is plausible that the ad hoc Tribunals may be encouraged to 
adopt some form of incapacitative sentencing and lengthen the sentences of convicted persons 
on grounds of public protection.77 In such instances – given that the rights of offenders must 
be balanced against those of potential victims – the Trial Chambers must be mindful of the 
need to ensure that the predictive judgements stand up to thorough challenge. 
                                                             
72 Prosecutor v. Delalic& Others, ICTY Judgement of 16 November 1998, para. 1234. 
73 Memorandum of Proposals for the Prosecution and Punishment of Certain War Criminals and Other Offenders 
(1946). 
74Prosecutor v. Kunarac& Others, para. 840. 
75Prosecutor v. Tadic,ICTY Judgement of 26 January 2000, para. 48, Prosecutor v Aleksovskipara. 185; and 
Prosecutor v. Delalic& Others, ICTYJudgement of 20 February 2001, para. 801. 
76Prosecutor v Delalicand others, para.456. 
77Prosecutor v Erdemovic, para. 339. 
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In the Tadiccase, in the Trial Chamber, the court, while providing equal emphasis to deterrence 
and retribution as purposes of sentencing, the court also went ahead and provided rehabilitation 
and incapacitation as other desired purposes of sentencing.78 In the Appeals Chamber of the 
Tadic case, highlighted that deterrence cannot be given undue prominence in the assessment of 
punishment.79 
A review of the sentencing decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals reveal that the judges at The 
Hague face a substantial challenge balancing the various rationales for punishment. Based on 
the Security Council Resolution, retribution and deterrence were understood to be the main 
purposes of sentencing, however, the judges of the ICTY have used their discretion to include 
other purposes such as incapacitation and rehabilitation as purposes of sentencing. However, 
the judges have failed to show how these purposes reflect on the sentences themselves. 
 
3.3.4. GRAVITY OF CRIMES 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Alekskovski, stated that the gravity of the crimes is the 
‘litmus test for sentencing for the appropriate sentence.’80 The Blaskic and Alekskovski cases 
have also stated that the gravity of the offence is the most important consideration in 
sentencing.81 Theoretically, gravity of crimes is determined inabstracto and in concreto. The 
gravity in abstracto is based on the subjective and objective elements of the crime while the 
gravity in concreto depends on the harm done and on the culpability of the offender.82 
Connected with the gravity in abstracto is the issue of the hierarchy of the crimes before the 
court. The Appeals Chamber has previously stated that there is no hierarchy of the crimes and 
among war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.83 The Chamber stated that they are 
all serious violations of international law.84 However, in earlier case law, the court entertained 
the idea that there did exist hierarchy of crimes as a way of determining the gravity of the 
crimes.85 There is no uniform approach to the issue of a hierarchy of crimes. In the 
Erdemovic,Tadicand Furundzijacases, the Appeals Chamber favoured some sort of 
                                                             
78Prosecutor v Tadic, para. 61. 
79Prosecutor v Tadic, para. 56. 
80Prosecutor v Alekskovski, para. 1225. 
81Prosecutor v Blaskic, ICTY Judgement of 29 July 2004, Prosecutor v Alekskovski, para. 360. 
82 Danner A M, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing ‘609. 
83Prosecutor v Mrksic&Sljivancanin, ICTY Judgement of 5 May 2009, 298. 
84Prosecutor v Mrksic&Sljivancanin, para. 546.  
85Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY Judgemnt of 14 July 1997, para. 73. 
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classification of the crimes while the court in Tadic and Alekskovskirejected the notion that 
there was a hierarchy of crimes.86 
With regard to genocide, the court held it is the most heinous crime based on its 
dolusspecialis.87 However, it should be noted that the notion of a gradation of the crimes is still 
very much disputed. 
It should be noted that there is no statutory hierarchy of the crimes or a gradation of any kind. 
This jurisprudence has come up as a result of the scant law on sentencing within the ICTY 
Statute. 
A further issue exists, with regard to gravity in concreto. This relates to the individual conduct 
of the accused person. The courts have on occasion failed to differentiate between the 
aggravating circumstances and the gravity of the crime charged when making their judgement. 
 
3.3.5. REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL PRACTICE IN THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA 
The ICTY has indicted 161 individuals, 83 were sentenced and 19 were acquitted.88 
The criminal law of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in this connection, 
permitted courts to sentence convicted persons to death, a term of imprisonment or a fine. With 
respect to imprisonment (the only punishment applicable to the present discussion), the general 
rule was that imprisonment may not be shorter than fifteen days, nor exceed fifteen years.89 
However, for crimes for which capital punishment was prescribed, the court could also impose 
the sanction of imprisonment for twenty years.90 Imprisonment for life was not authorised 
under the penal code as it was deemed to be ‘a fate worse than death’.91 
As for the case law of the courts of the former Yugoslavia, the Chamber noted that it was so 
sparse that significant conclusions as to the sentencing practices thereof could not be drawn. 
The Chamber concluded that reference to law in the former Yugoslavia and its application 
                                                             
86Prosecutor v Tadic, para. 123, Prosecutor v Alekskovski, para. 436. 
87Prosecutor v Krstic, ICTY Judgement of 2 August 2001, para. 700. 
88http://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures. 
89Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (Yugoslavia). 
90 Article 38, Criminal Code of The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), it was adopted by the 
SFRY Assembly at the session of the Federal Council held in September 28, 1976. 
91Jones J, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
Transnational Publishers, New York, 2000, 438. 
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reflected the practice in the general principle of law recognised by nations where the most 
severe penalty is imposed for crimes against humanity. This meant that all such persons could 
be held responsible. 
This merely provided that the crimes did exist prior to the conflict but it did not help much by 
way of the sentencing. It did not provide specific rules or guidance for the meting out of 
punishment. In any case, the Appeals Chamber held that even though the Tribunals is guided 
by the general practice of sentencing in the former Yugoslavia, it is not bound to follow it.92 
So this still leaves us with a situation where the judicial discretion is still unfettered.  
3.4. CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter has provided for the practice of the former Yugoslavia and highlighted the factors 
that have influence the sentencing practice while looking into the case law of the court. This 
will provide a necessary basis for the next chapter while looking discussion the jurisprudence 













                                                             












CHAPTER 4: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ICTY JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE POINT 





This chapter shall look into the ICTY jurisprudence through the lens of H.L.A. Hart and the 
principle of legality. An in depth discussion will be made on whether or not the judges of the 
court had such wide judicial discretion as would threaten the principle of legality. This 
discussion will seek to establish that factors of sentencing have been inconsistently applied by 
the judges who on one hand had little substantive law to rely on and on the other hand were not 
bound by the principle of stare decisis. 
The Statute of the ICTY provides some norms on sentencing, however, it contains very few 
sentencing principles. The elements that are themselves underdeveloped include a 
comprehensive sentencing scheme, the purposes of sentencing, and the scope of the 
punishment.93 This has then led to judges having wide discretion which has in turn led to 
inconsistencies in similar cases. The final result has been the challenge to legality of the 
sentencing of the Tribunal.  
                                                             
93D’ascoli S, Sentencing in International Criminal Law: the UN ad hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for 
the ICC, 2. 
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4.2. HART’S JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE SENTENCING PRACTICE OF 
THE ICTY 
 
The first thing to consider is the fact that the provisions on sentencing are minimal. The law on 
sentencing is actually codified in the Statute and as such acts as the primary rules for sentencing 
according to Hart. That means, that it is the substantive law on sentencing as far as the ICTY 
is concerned. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence later passed also contains other provisions 
on sentencing in Rule 10194. The reference to the general practice of the former Yugoslavia 
acts as a secondary rule. This is because it assists the judges on the procedural part of the law. 
In particular, it is a secondary rule of recognition because it points judges to another potential 
source of law95.  
However, As far as the ICTY Statute is concerned, very little by way of the sentencing penalties 
is mentioned. This is a huge part of the problem. The Statute merely provides that the sentence 
is limited to life imprisonment and that the Tribunal shall refer to the general sentencing 
practice of the former Yugoslavia.96 This is in itself different from the sentencing practice 
found the Civil Law tradition of sentencing ranges and the Common Law tradition of 
sentencing guidelines. 
When looking at the theses that Hart proposed are the core of positivism, I shall focus on two 
only. These are the pedigree thesis and the discretion thesis.97 The pedigree thesis deals with 
who makes the laws and whether the laws made are valid. It does this by looking at whether 
the body that made the laws has the power to make the laws. In this case, the Tadic case settles 
this issue by emphasizing that the Security Council has the power to set up the Tribunal owing 
to its Chapter VII powers of maintaining international peace and security. This then rendered 
the ICTY Statute valid as law. It also affirmed the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the crimes 
within the Statute. 
The issue comes in with the discretion thesis.98This states that where there is scarce law, judges 
have the right to decide in whichever way they want. In such a case, they enjoy wide discretion, 
especially when they have to consider conflicting social considerations. This has been the case 
within the Tribunal. Since there was little law on sentencing to begin with, and the doctrine of 
                                                             
94Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY. 
95 Hart H L A, The Concept of Law, 91. 
96Article 24, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
97Hart H L A,The Concept of Law, 141. 
98Hart H L A, The Concept of Law, 100. 
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stare decisis does not occur, there has been inconsistent interpretation on issues with regard to 
sentencing which has then put the judges in a precarious position where they have become the 
law makers within the Tribunal as far as sentencing is concerned. The judges are not bound by 
precedent, and neither are they bound by the general practice of the former Yugoslavia. Since, 
this has left the judges acting as the law makers on the sentencing, this has in turn undermined 
the legality of the sentences passed. This has led to the encroachment of the pedigree thesis 
which looks at who passes the law.99 Since the Statute itself is the law, and the lawmakers in 
this case is the Security Council, this has then given judges powers which are unfettered and 
has threatened the legality of the sentences passed. It has also led to lack of uniformity which 
is unfair to potential accused persons.  
This wide discretion that the judges have enjoyed is shown by the fact that the Chambers has 
been unable to decide on the sentencing purposes of the Tribunal. The Statute itself was not 
clear to begin with, and this made the judges decide differently on this issue. This has in turn, 
led to very different sentences. The ICTY has recognised that besides being retributory and a 
deterrent, punishment should also fulfil an objective of rehabilitation and incapacitation.100 The 
first of these theories – which emphasises the treatment, rather than the punishment of 
convicted offenders – is necessary especially when the accused are young and ill-trained.  
The Trial Chamber sitting in the case of Prosecutor v. Delalic& Others recognised that the 
protection of society from convicted persons was a prominent factor in the determination of 
appropriate sentence101. 
4.3. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND THE SENTENCING PRACTICE OF 
THE ICTY 
 
While looking at the principle of legality, the component of nullapoena sine praevia legepoenali 
and the component of nullapoena sine legestricta has been satisfied. For the first one, since the 
law on sentencing is already written down. Further, the laws proscribing genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity are in the Statute. There is no retroactivity of the law here since 
the crimes are prohibited in the Statute. The component of nullapoena sine leg stricta has also 
been satisfied since the law itself is clearly written and there are no analogies used in describing 
the laws or in describing the sentencing laws and procedure. 
                                                             
99Himma K, ‘Judicial Discretion and the Concept of Law’Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1999), 71 – 82.  
100Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic, para. 48, Prosecutor v Delalic&Others, para. 801.  
101Judgement of 20 February 2001, para. 456. 
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The issue comes in with the component of nullapoena sine legecerta. The laws on sentencing 
are do not have specificity and are not certain. They only maintain that punishment may be up 
to life imprisonment. This makes it hard for individuals to be able to foresee the sort of 
punishment that they would incur if convicted of a certain crime under the Statute. It lacks the 
necessary amount of predictability required in any legal system. Further, it can be argued that 
the component of nullapoena sine legescripta has not been satisfied owing to the fact that very 
little law is found in the Statute as far as sentencing is concerned. This has led to judges having 
very wide discretion on sentencing, placing them in a position to make a lot of law on 
sentencing within the Tribunal.  
4.4. ICC SENTENCING: LOOKING FORWARD 
 
Article 22 and 23 of the Statute deals with the principle of legality.102 Article 22 deals with the 
nullacrimen sine lege component while Article 23 deals with the nullapoena sine 
legecomponent.103 
The Rome Statute contains similar provisions on sentencing as the ICTY Statute. Article 77 
and 78 of the Rome Statute provides for the applicable penalties before the ICC. These are 
imprisonment up to 30 years and life imprisonment justified by extreme gravity of the crime.104 
In addition a fine may be imposed and forfeiture of goods, assets and property derived directly 
or indirectly from the crimes committed.105 
The Rome Statute and the ICTY Statute are similar in as far as they both prescribe 
imprisonment as the applicable punishment while not recognising the death penalty. The Rome 
Statute, however, goes a bit further and provides that fines and forfeitures can be ordered. This 
has been influenced by the practice by many states to remove death penalty within their 
domestic criminal justice systems. It is also influenced by one of the more dominant purposes 
of punishment within criminal justice systems in the twenty first century which is 
rehabilitation. Unlike the ICTY Statute, the Rome Statute limits the imprisonment term 
imposed by the court to thirty years unless when justified by extreme gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.106 The Rome Statute further prescribes 
that in determining the sentence, the court shall take into account factors such as the gravity of 
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the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.107 The courts also consider 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the gravity of the crime and the role of the 
perpetrator.108 For example, the ICTR and the ICTY have established that aiders and abetters 
get a lower sentence than co-perpetrators.109 
In determining the sentence, the court will look at the gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convict and shall pronounce the sentence, with regard to every single 
count for which the individual has been convicted.110 
So far, only four individuals have been convicted Jean Pierre Bemba, Germaine Katanga, 
Thomas LubangaDvilo, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi.111 It is too early to predict or outline a 
sentencing practice of the ICC as of yet, but caution must be advised to the court.  
In its thirteen years of existence the ICC has convicted four persons. The first convicted person 
was Thomas Lubanga, who was found guilty for the war crime of conscripting and enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen. He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.112 The second 
convicted person was Germaine Katanga who was jailed for 12 years.113 Mr. Katanga was 
found guilty, as an accessory, of one count of crimes against humanity (murder) and four counts 
of war crimes. The third person was Jean Pierre Bemba who was convicted of two counts of 
crimes against humanity and three counts of war crimes.114 He was sentenced to 18 years, the 
highest imprisonment term passed since the court began its work.115 The fourth person was 
Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi who plead guilty for the war crime of attacking religious and 
historical buildings in the Malian city of Timbuktu.116 He was sentenced to 9 years 
imprisonment.117 
While the Rome Statute is more detailed, there still lacks a bit more on the sentencing. There 
should be more law as far as sentencing is concerned, otherwise, the court may find itself, in 
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the same situation as the ICTY where judges have wide judicial discretion which might affect 










CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The entire thesis looks at the sentencing practice of the ICTY from the point of view of 
positivism and in particular, the theories espoused by H L A Hart. It also evaluates the 
sentencing practice of the ICTY by looking at the principle of legality. Finally, the thesis looks 
at the ICC so far.  
According to Hart, the law is based on these three. These are the separability thesis, the 
pedigree thesis and the discretion thesis.118 
The rules on sentencing of the ICTY include a maximum of life imprisonment and 
consideration based on the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the 
accused person. This is unlike the common law practice of sentencing guidelines or the civil 
law practice of sentencing ranges.  
The sentencing of the ICTY is largely based on the discretion thesis that allows for judges to 
look at all the considerations before them and come to whatever conclusion they need to. This 
then leads to a lack of uniformity on decisions concerning the same thing. This is encouraged 
by the limited amount of law on sentencing in the ICTY Statute. This then places the judges in 
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a position where their discretion is unfettered and they end up making a lot of the law on 
sentencing. This then undermines the pedigree thesis.  
The evidence of this wide discretion leading to the lack of uniformity is seen in three main 
things: the divergent views of Chambers on the purposes of sentencing, the application of the 
general practice of the former Yugoslavia and the lacking written law on punishment.  
The Chambers cannot decide whether the purpose of sentencing should be deterrence, 
rehabilitation, incapacitation or retribution. With regard to the general practice of the former 
Yugoslavia, which the tribunal should use as a guide, the Chambers has been clear that it is not 
bound by it. Further, the practice of the former Yugoslavia at the time was not detailed on how 
to handle sentencing, especially for the crimes for which the tribunal has jurisdiction.    
The judges’ wide discretion leaves them making a lot of the law on sentencing which 
supersedes their powers. The Security Council in this case is the body that could make the laws 
as was established by Tadic. This then means that the validity of the sentences passed is in 
question. 
Also, when looking at the principle of legality. The component of nullapoena sine legecerta 
and nullapoena sine legescriptaare not satisfied. This is owing to the fact that the written law 
on sentencing is so little and so much remains unwritten. The judges are left to decide on so 
much, which ends up with them making the law themselves.119 
The overall effect is that there is no foreseeability as far as the punishment to be meted out is 
concerned. This is unfair to potential accused persons who should be able to determine, though 
not with accuracy, what penalty they might incur.  
Since the ICC is the first ever permanent international criminal law court, it should take 




In conclusion, the following recommendations are made: 
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(i) There should be a collaborative effort between Assembly of State Parties in order 
to establish a hierarchy for the crimes stated in the Rome Statute. This would make 
it easier to determine the likely punishment for a certain crime. 
(ii) The judges should draft sentencing guidelines which should subsequently be passed 
by the Assembly of State Parties, in order to add more guidance for the judges. 
(iii) Alternatively, the judges could come up with sentencing ranges for the crimes 
proscribed by the Rome Statute. 
(iv) A new rule on sentencing judgements should be passed by the ASP, requiring 
judges to write down more detailed judgements so that it is easier to determine what 
policy considerations the judge made on a certain case. 
(v) In order to prevent retroactivity, the judges should also endeavour to codify, the 
rules or judges they would need, in order to reduce the likelihood of them relying 
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